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ABSTRACT 
Buyouts have been described as a specific form of financial acquisition that leads to potentially 
substantial, but also highly volatile returns to equity investors. Previous research has illustrated a 
number of mechanisms through which buyouts cause increases or decreases in company value. 
Besides the traditional mechanisms like improved governance or incentive systems, more 
innovative and entrepreneurial levers like increasing strategic distinctiveness  and parenting 
effects get examined. While it is important to understand the performance impact of each of these 
levers individually, we are still missing a comprehensive framework that captures the full 
complexity of the buyout value generation process and recognizes interdependencies between 
various factors. In this paper, we develop a three-dimensional conceptual framework for value 
generation in buyouts that categorizes and links the different levers of buyouts value generation. 
This framework provides the basis to take a look beyond individual value levers and shed light on 
the underlying strategic logic of buyouts. We then review the literature on buyouts and categorize 
previously identified levers of value generation according to our framework. At the same time, 
we identify a number of levers that have received little attention in the academic literature so far 
or still lack convincing empirical support for their performance impact. Building upon this 
assessment of the status quo in research in buyout value generation, we outline an agenda for 
future research. 
 
KEYWORDS:  Private Equity, Buyout, Value Generation 
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INTRODUCTION 
A buyout1 can be defined as the purchase of a controlling stake in a company (or a division) from 
its owners for a limited time, usually financed through a combination of equity and debt and with 
strong involvement of specialized financial investment companies (e.g., Wright et al., 1994a: 
216; Meulbroek, 1996: 4; Coyle, 2000: 34), the so-called buyout associations2 (Jensen, 1989a)3. 
Buyouts represent the later stage investment category of private equity while venture capital 
represents the early stage . They are archetypes of "unrelated" acquisitions as buyout firms 
typically manage their portfolio companies completely independent from one another (Baker & 
Montgomery, 1994). This form of takeover is not motivated by potential advantages from the 
integration of the acquired into another entity ("synergies"), but by the intention to increase the 
value of the takeover target as a stand-alone business beyond the purchase price (Baker & 
Montgomery, 1994).  
In the last twenty years buyout activity increased significantly (see Table X) and buyouts 
have emerged as an important field of interest for the financial community as well as for 
academics (Wright & Robbie, 1998) and modes of value generation have always been at the 
forefront of interest. Researchers from fields as diverse as finance, strategic management, 
economics and entrepreneurship have looked at the issue of value generation in buyouts from 
their respective perspectives and have identified a series of levers that contribute to acquirer 
                                                           
1 In the literature buyout transactions are variously labeled (e.g., leveraged buyout, management buyout, institutional buyout, 
management buyin, etc.) and often used synonymously. In this article the term "buyout" as being the broadest is preferred. 
Whenever necessary for the sake of precision, the respective term will be clarified by context or explanation. 
2   A commonly accepted single definition does not exist. In the most simple form, buyouts are defined as "the purchase of a 
controlling stake in a company (or a division) from its owners". This would mean that any acquisition of a company is a form 
of buyout (cf. Coyle, 2000: 34). For the purpose of this article, it is important to adhere to the definition provided above.    
3 Jensen (1989a: 37) introduced the term "LBO association" to the discussion (cf. Baker & Montgomery, 1994). In this article the 
broader term "buyout association" is preferred for obvious reasons.  
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returns from buyouts.4  
For a long time academics have employed agency theory as the predominant lens to 
examine buyouts and especially buyout value generation. Changes in governance and incentive 
systems as well as activities to increase efficiency have therefore been examined closely (e.g., 
Jensen, 1989a; Kaplan, 1989a; Cotter & Peck, 2001). Only recently, Wright et al. (Wright et al., 
2000; Wright et al., 2001a; Wright et al., 2001b) broadened the discussion by showing that 
buyout transactions also can create entrepreneurial opportunities and  be vehicles for renewal that 
lead frequently to growth, corporate revitalization and strategic innovation. This makes buyouts 
an interesting setting to observe a variety of value generation mechanisms and discuss the 
implications for non-buyout situations. 
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive overview over more than two decades of 
research on the factors that determine the value impact of buyouts. We identify three independent 
dimensions, along which levers of buyout value generation can be classified in mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive categories. Out of these three dimensions, we develop a 
three-dimensional framework that captures the complexity of the buyout value generation process 
and recognizes the differences between different levers regarding the timing of the effect, the 
mechanism of value creation and the relevance of specific characteristics of the equity investors.  
This framework enables us to understand interdependencies between individual levers and the 
overall process of buyout value generation. We then map levers of buyout value generation that 
have been previously discussed in the literature according to these three dimensions and highlight 
implications from our analysis for practitioners and academics. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The first section introduces three 
                                                           
4 Throughout the paper we take a general and broad view on levers discussed, i.e., we do not take value generation levers into 
consideration that are based on very specific country characteristics. On the other hand it is also possible that some of the 
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independent dimensions of buyout value generation and develops our three-dimensional 
framework accordingly. We then conduct an extensive review of the previous literature and 
discuss a variety of levers of value generation that have been proposed, presenting the academic 
discourse around individual levers whenever appropriate. Our paper concludes with an 
assessment of the status quo of the research on buyout value generation and outlines promising 
areas for future research in this domain. 
 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF BUYOUT VALUE GENERATION5
Total value generation in buyouts is the result of a variety of value generation levers working 
together in a complex process. These different levers take effect during different phases of the 
buyout, they differ in the way they cause value generation and they can originate either within the 
target company or evolve out of the interaction between target company and equity investors. To 
capture this complexity, we have developed a conceptual framework of buyout value generation 
along three independent dimensions. 
 
Dimension One: Phases of Buyout Value Generation 
On the most aggregate level, we can distinguish between three phases of a buyout: 
Acquisition phase, holding period and divestment phase. This distinction can be made in two 
respects: Regarding the question of when relevant value generation decisions are taken and 
during which phase value generation ultimately takes place.   
The acquisition phase starts with the negotiation and due diligence process, during which 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
levers discussed are not applicable in selected countries due to special legal or tax regulations. 
5 Several researchers who have analyzed value generation in buyouts also address the question whether returns from buyouts 
come from some form of "wealth transfer" from other stakeholders, such as employees, prior bondholders, prior shareholders, 
the tax-payers etc. (For an overview see Marais et al., 1989; Lehn & Poulsen, 1990; Palepu, 1990; Ippolito & James, 1992) 
We consider these questions as beyond the scope of our paper and will focus solely on how the various levers contribute to 
the total value generation 
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the investors familiarize themselves with the company and develop a business plan for the 
buyout. In the case of a management buyout, where current management participates in a buy-out 
along with financiers, this is the time when the foundations are laid for the relationship between 
the management team that initiates the deal and the sponsoring equity investors. Probably the 
single most important value determinant in this phase is the valuation of the target company and 
the corresponding acquisition price on which seller and acquirer agree at the end of their 
negotiations. This entry price sets the hurdle for all future valuations and is one fundamental 
determinant of the breakeven point for the equity investors. At the end of the acquisition phase, 
the acquirer makes important decisions regarding the structure of the buyout, such as the degree 
of financial leverage, the distribution of management equity stakes, the design of incentive 
systems, etc. It has been argued that much of the buyout value generation is "front loaded", in 
that it is determined through decisions that are already taken during the acquisition phase (Baker 
& Montgomery, 1994).  
It is during the subsequent holding period, that the strategic, organizational and 
operational changes prescribed in the initial business plan are being implemented and intended 
operational improvements are being realized. In practice, this is often more of an iterative than a 
linear process, in which the business plan is constantly updated.  
The  divestment phase constitutes the end of the buyout. It determines the divestment 
mode (trade sale, IPO, etc.) as well as the divestment valuation, as the final important 
determinant of buyout value generation. The divestment is a crucial part of the buyout, as it is 
during this phase that equity investors ultimately realize the returns6. 
 
                                                           
6 Here we assume that the majority of returns come from the divestment, rather than from intermediate cash flows to the equity 
investors during the holding period. 
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Dimension Two: Causes of Buyout Value Generation 
Value generation in buyouts has been typically analysed from the perspective of the equity 
investors in buyout transactions, i.e. in terms of an appreciation of the equity value of a given 
business over a certain period of time7. Following simple accounting math, we can decompose 
the equity value of a business into four determinants: valuation multiple, revenues, margin and 
net debt.8 This leads to the following equation: 
 
Equity Value = Valuation Multiple * Revenues * Margin – Net Debt 
 
Changes in equity value consequently have to be linked to a change in at least one of these four 
components. Based on this seemingly technical equation of determinants of value generation, we 
can introduce an important distinction between two basic classes of value generation (see 
Gottschalg et al, 2004).  
The first type of increase in the equity value of a company is linked to changes in the 
valuation of the business, i.e. to the assumptions according to which the enterprise value of a 
company is determined based on a given level of financial performance.  Simply speaking, this is 
captured by the valuation multiple in our equation. The valuation may be partially influenced by 
changes in the financial performance.9 On top of that, however, there are several additional 
factors that can cause changes in the valuation of a company across time.  Examples are changes 
in the market valuation multiples for comparable companies or updated expectations regarding 
the future financial performance (in terms of expected magnitude and variance of the returns) of a 
                                                           
7 Practitioners typically evaluate value generation in buyouts based on the calculation of an "internal rate of return", which 
corresponds to the compounded annualized percentage increase in equity value.  
8 Depending on the valuation methods used, it is possible to work with a net profit margin and a net profit multiple, an EBIT 
margin and EBIT multiple, EBITDA margin and EBITDA multiple, etc.  
9 A company that is currently valued at nine times EBITDA and doubles EBITDA often more than doubles its value, as the 
improved performance often also induces an increase in the valuation multiple, say, from nine times EBITDA to ten times 
EBITDA. 
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business or an entire industry.  Essential for the realization of increases in the equity value of a 
buyout company are valuations at the time of acquisition and divestiture, which are typically the 
outcome of a negotiation process between the respective buyer and seller. To reflect the fact that 
these value increases can occur without any change in the underlying financial performance of 
the business, we shall hereafter refer to this type of value generation as "value capturing". 
The second type of value generation is directly linked to a fundamental change in the 
financial performance of the target organization, i.e. either to improvements in revenues or 
margins or to the reduction of capital requirements.  Such a change stems from factors such as 
improvements in operating performance (revenue growth, improved operating margin, etc.), 
reduced cost of capital (optimization of capital structure, better financing terms etc.) or the 
freeing-up of resources through a reduction in the required fixed or current assets. Changes in 
financial performance have an impact on Revenues, Margin or Net Debt (or any combination of 
these) in our equation. We shall hereafter refer to this type of value generation as " value 
creation". Changes in net debt can also be related to a conscious decision to change the capital 
structure, i.e. changing the mix between debt and equity on the balance sheet by replacing one 
with the other. This does not constitute any change in company value per se and is therefore not 
relevant to our analysis. 
Based on this technical decomposition of buyout value generation into value capturing 
and value creation, we can illustrate the causal dimension of buyout value generation, which 
consists of two levels. 
  We start with factors of value capturing, i.e. levers that have no direct impact on the 
financial performance, and influence the valuation of the company with a given financial 
performance (i.e. the valuation multiple).  
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In contrast to this, the levers of value creation have a direct impact on the financial 
performance of the business. They can be subdivided according to a two-level generic taxonomy 
of value creation activities (Porter, 1985; Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998) into primary and secondary 
levers. The primary levers have a direct bottom line effect and lead to direct value generation 
through improvements in financial engineering, operational effectiveness and strategic 
distinctiveness.  In addition to that, we can identify two secondary levers of value creation. These 
levers do not have any direct impact on the financial performance or cash flow generation of a 
company, but enhance one or several of the primary levers of value generation. Secondary levers 
of value generation include factors such as reducing agency costs or support from the new equity 
investors. They enhance the effect of one or several primary levers. For example, an increased 
incentive alignment between target company management and new shareholders does not have 
any impact on profits or cash flow generation per se, but may help to remove operational 
inefficiencies or to achieve a better strategic positioning (see Figure 1).  
 
--- Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
 
Dimension Three: Sources of Buyout Value Generation 
Different types of buyout value generation can be distinguished according to the degree to which 
they depend on specific characteristics of the equity investors involved in the buyout. On the one 
extreme of this dimension, we find value generation that occurs entirely within the boundaries of 
the portfolio company and that would occur in any buyout context independent of specific 
characteristics of the equity investors. One example of such "intrinsic value generation" would be 
value generation through improvements in operational efficiency that were achieved without any 
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form of knowledge transfer from the equity investors. On the other extreme, we have value 
generation that is inherently linked to specific characteristics of the equity investors (network, 
expertise, experience, capability, strategy, etc.) and that occurs through an interaction between 
the portfolio company and the equity investors. An example for such "extrinsic value generation" 
would be a specific expertise of the equity investors leading to value creation through 
improvements in the financial performance of the portfolio company that would not have been 
possible with the skills previously available at the portfolio company itself. Levers of extrinsic 
value generation are comparable with the effects of a "parenting advantage” that business units 
may enjoy as part of a Multibusiness company (Goold et al., 1994). Clearly, these two extreme 
cases mark a continuum and many types of value generation fall between the polar ends of this 
dimension. 
 
CATEGORIZING LEVERS OF BUYOUT VALUE GENERATION 
More than two decades of research on buyouts has lead to a number of propositions regarding 
possible levers of buyout value generation. Many of those are today widely accepted as crucial 
ingredients of successful buyout transaction. What we have been missing so far is a 
comprehensive view on these various levers that enables us to go beyond the analysis of each 
individual factor and helps us understand the underlying mechanics of buyout value generation. 
In the following passage, we will revisit the levers of buyout value generation that have been 
proposed in the literature and categorize them along the three dimensions of our conceptual 
framework.  
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Levers of Value Capturing 
 Financial  arbitrage 
The first important group of levers of buyout value generation that has received substantial 
attention in the literature can be classified as financial arbitrage, i.e., the ability to generate 
returns from differences in the valuation applied to a company between acquisition and 
divestment independent of changes in the underlying financial performance of the business ("buy 
low - sell high strategy"). The valuation rationale for a company depends on the market valuation 
multiples for comparable companies, private information and differential expectations regarding 
the future financial performance of a business or an entire industry and the negotiation process 
through which buyer and seller agree on the valuation. Financial arbitrage based on any of those 
four factors may be a source of value generation in buyouts. 
  
Financial arbitrage based on changes in market valuation 
First of all, returns to equity investors in buyouts may be influenced by changes in the public 
market valuation multiples for comparable companies. To the extent that the valuation of the 
business at acquisition and divestment is correlated with the change in public market valuation 
multiples, equity investors may benefit or suffer from this exogenous effect. In some cases, 
buyout investors are able to successfully arbitrage within private markets or between private and 
public markets and vice versa or to more accurately predict the future evolution of public market 
valuation multiples than their counterparts in the valuation negotiation and benefit accordingly. 
This type of financial arbitrage has received surprisingly little attention in the academic literature 
so far, even though it is often mentioned by practitioners ("multiple riding"). It does not cause 
any changes in the financial performance of the portfolio company and consequently constitutes a 
case of value capturing.  It is extrinsic to the portfolio company, in that it largely depends on 
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characteristics of the buyout investors and is determined exclusively during the acquisition and 
divestment phases. 
  The valuation of a business is typically also based on expectations regarding magnitude 
and volatility of its future financial performance, so information about the future development of 
the business plays a crucial role in the valuation process. Information asymmetries between the 
equity investors and their counterparts in the valuation negotiation can consequently be another 
source of financial arbitrage. In general, we can distinguish between two different types of 
information asymmetry: an informational advantage because of insider information and because 
of a unique expertise in an industry. Both of these can be a source of value capturing. 
 
Financial arbitrage based on private information about the portfolio company 
Early on, it has been argued that insider information could be an important value lever in 
buyout transactions (DeAngelo et al., 1984; Lowenstein, 1985; Wright & Coyne, 1985; 
DeAngelo, 1986; Jensen, 1989a; Lehn & Poulsen, 1989; Opler, 1992), especially in management 
buyouts (MBOs) where the incumbent management is part of the equity investors and can take 
direct advantage of their information advantage vis-à-vis the previous owners through an equity 
participation in the transaction.  
It has been argued that an opportunistic management team could take advantage of private 
information on the future development of the company (Ofek, 1994). In extreme cases they could 
even depress or manipulate reported or forecasted earnings10 (Lowenstein, 1985; DeAngelo, 
1986; Hite & Vetsuypens, 1989) to lower the acquisition price, i.e., to buy a company for less 
                                                           
10 See Lowenstein (1985) for a detailed description of possible insiders' techniques intended to directly or indirectly depress the 
price of a company (e.g., cutting the dividend or increase it less than the market expects; officers decline to meet with security 
analysts, thus withholding the kind of detailed information and access to senior officers without which analysts and 
investment advisors do not feel comfortable; accelerate investment in long term projects for a period of time, thereby reducing 
reported earnings without affecting intrinsic or enterprise value)  
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than a similarly informed bidder would be willing to pay, and informed owners would be willing 
to accept (Kaplan, 1989a). In this case vendor's shareholders may be considered to have 
experienced a loss if the transaction allows managers to exploit their private information (Palepu, 
1990; Thompson et al., 1992).  
While it is imaginable that severe under-pricing may have been frequent in the early years 
of buyout growth (Wright & Coyne, 1985), subsequent observations on buyout performance 
should have alerted later vendors to the need to anticipate gains and to price accordingly 
(Thompson et al., 1992). Furthermore it seems unlikely that managers of buyout targets have 
systematically hidden information about earnings and prospects and have been able to 
monopolize the bidding (Lowenstein, 1985; Palepu, 1990; Singh, 1990). Acquisitions usually 
underlie extensive disclosure requirements (Lee, 1992) and need to be evaluated by independent 
committees of the board of directors and not only by the managers themselves (KKR, 1989; 
Magowan, 1989; Palepu, 1990). Additionally, the increase in buyout activity, the associated 
professionalisation of vendors, and the increased activity of security analysts, as well as the 
establishment of open auctions as the de-facto standard selling process (Jensen, 1989b; Wright & 
Robbie, 1996; Lerner et al., 1998; Wright et al., 2001a)  should have minimized the importance 
of insider information as a source of value capturing. Therefore, we come to the same conclusion 
as (Singh, 1990), that "the pure managerial opportunism argument implies a higher level of 
manipulation of superior information by management teams than is feasible in a competitive 
acquisition environment". 
Additionally, it should be kept in mind that only one special type of buyouts, the 
management buyout, allows the exploitation of this kind of informational advantage (Long & 
Ravenscraft, 1993b) and that other types of buyout transactions like management buyins or 
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institutional buyouts have gained increasing importance in recent years (Wright & Robbie, 1996; 
Lerner et al., 1998).  
However, while private information may not be the sole or dominant reason for buyout 
transactions, favourable inside information is likely to be a motivation for managers to propose 
an MBO (Lee, 1992). 
 
To our knowledge, another type of financial arbitrage through information asymmetries 
has not received any attention in the literature so far. Value capturing is also possible through the 
exploitation of information advantages during the divestment phase, namely in cases where the 
post-buyout acquirer holds more advantageous believes regarding the expected financial 
performance of the portfolio company than the (better informed) selling buyout investors. Such 
information asymmetries may occur with or without some form of intentional "window dressing" 
by the selling party.  
Financial arbitrage based on the exploitation of private information of the portfolio 
company management team does not fundamentally impact the financial performance of the 
business and thus also belongs to the class of value capturing. It is extrinsic to the portfolio 
company, as it is linked to the specific characteristics of the equity investors (which includes the 
initiating management team in case of an MBO). It can take place during either the acquisition or 
the divestment phase.  
 
Financial arbitrage through superior market information 
Financial arbitrage through information asymmetries does not necessarily depend on private 
information, but may also be a result of a unique expertise in assessing the value of a business 
based on market intelligence. Buyout firms are known for their extensive organisational and 
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people networks. Their constant contact with a wide range of companies and top managers allows 
them to build up a significant industry expertise (Anders, 1992).  This provides them with access 
to superior market information as well as the ability to interpret them in a way that gives them a 
competitive advantage over the average market participant (Fox & Marcus, 1992). Like all other 
cases of financial arbitrage, such value generation is a case of value capturing.  It is extrinsic to 
the portfolio company as it depends on a specific expertise of the buyout investors and can 
happen during the acquisition or the divestment phase. 
 
Financial arbitrage through superior deal making capabilities 
Financial arbitrage can also be linked to distinct capabilities in "deal making", i.e. the ability to 
identify suitable acquisition targets, limit the competition from other potential buyers and manage 
the negotiation and acquisition processes (Wright & Robbie, 1996; Baker & Smith, 1998). Large 
and well-established buyout firms conduct regular and systematic reviews of the market for 
potential buyout candidates, and at the same time obtain useful information about various 
industries' developments (Anders, 1992). Often, these companies are part of a network that 
allows privileged access to transactions ("proprietary deal flow") (Kaufman & Englander, 1993; 
Wright & Robbie, 1996).  
  The limitation of competition from other potential buyout or strategic investors for the 
target company has a strong impact on the resulting acquisition price. Whereas in exclusive 
negotiations, buyer and seller will agree on a acquisition price somewhere between their 
respective valuations of the company, competition tends to bid up the acquisition prices to the 
valuation of the second-highest bidder, reducing the value that can be captured by the winning 
party to their unique value generation potential (Barney, 1988). Similarly, buyout firms can 
leverage their network to optimize their exit strategy for the portfolio company, either through the 
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identification of a suitable buyer or through the preparation of a public offering. Again, the ability 
to make an exit mode possible that leads to the highest valuation for the business, contributes to 
the value generation for the buyout investors. 
  In addition, buyout firms approach potential acquisition targets with sensitivity and are 
perceived as excellent and tough negotiators that are willing and able to adjust their negotiation 
postures and objectives as a deal evolves (Butler, 2001).  
  Financial arbitrage due to deal making and negotiation skills is a case of value capturing, 
which is exogenous to the portfolio company and can take place during both acquisition and 
divestment phase. 
 
Financial arbitrage through an optimization of corporate scope 
Sophisticated buyout investors are able to identify and exploit the so-called conglomerate 
discount effect, taking advantage of the fact that a multi-unit company may be less valuable as a 
whole than divided into pieces. Through the sale of peripheral undervalued businesses ("asset 
stripping"), buyout investors remove the conglomerate discount and benefit from the appreciation 
in the value of their assets (Magowan, 1989). This technique has been widely applied during the 
early days of buyout growth in the United States (Singh, 1993). 
   Financial  arbitrage through an optimization of corporate scope is a case of value 
capturing, which is exogenous to the portfolio company and can take place during all three 
phases of the buyout process. 
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Levers of Value Creation: Primary Levers 
    While financial arbitrage leads to value capturing without improvements in financial 
performance of the portfolio company, other levers of value generation improve the financial 
performance and generate real gains in the value of the acquired company (Kitching, 1989). They 
trigger a corporate restructuring process leading to significant and rapid changes in the firm's 
capital structure, assets and organizational structure and the corporate governance regime 
(Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990; Singh, 1993; Lei & Hitt, 1995). Company's objectives get revised 
and have in turn important consequences for the operating and strategic decisions of the firm 
(Seth & Easterwood, 1993). In line with the second dimension "causes of buyout value 
generation" from our framework, we will first concentrate on primary levers of value creation 
that are directly linked to such improvements in financial engineering, operational effectiveness 
or strategic distinctiveness.   
 
 Financial  engineering 
Financial engineering, i.e. the optimization of capital structure and minimization of after-tax cost 
of capital of the portfolio company is one of the most widely acknowledged levers applied by 
buyout firms to create value.  
 
Optimizing the capital structure 
Buyout firms possess intimate knowledge of capital market mechanisms and capitalize on 
their financial expertise in the buyout (Anders, 1992). They typically assist the management in 
negotiating bank loans, bond underwritings, initial public offerings, and subsequent stock sales. 
They leverage their excellent contacts in the financial community negotiating terms that the 
portfolio company would not have been able to get on a stand-alone basis (Magowan, 1989; 
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Kaufman & Englander, 1993). The reduction of the marginal agency costs of debt financing is 
possible, because buyout firms have long-term relationships with institutional lenders - 
consequently, the new equity owners have reduced incentives to transfer wealth from lenders 
(DeAngelo et al., 1984; DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1987). Buyout specialists are likely to be repeat 
players in the LBO debt market; with their reputations as "good" borrowers at stake, lenders are 
likely to deal with them on easier terms (Frankfurter & Gunay, 1992; Baker & Smith, 1998; 
Cotter & Peck, 2001). 
The application of their financial engineering skills helps a company to improve its 
complex capital structure and to find an optimal mix between debt and equity (Anders, 1992). 
This of course leads to an increase in debt, hence the common term "leveraged buyout". 
 
Reducing corporate tax 
Corporate tax savings as a consequence of increased leverage have also been identified as 
important sources of value creation in buyout transactions (Lowenstein, 1985; Bull, 1989; Hayn, 
1989; Kaplan, 1989b; Leland, 1989; Singh, 1990; Smith, 1990b; Frankfurter & Gunay, 1992; 
Long & Ravenscraft, 1993a). The increase in debt makes high tax-deductible interest payments 
necessary and provides a tax shield with a positive impact on cash flows11 (Kaplan, 1989b; 
Singh, 1990). Similarly, the step-up in book value of purchased assets and the subsequent 
application of more accelerated depreciation procedures may have value increasing effects as 
well (Bull, 1989; Kaplan, 1989b; Smith, 1990b; Baker & Smith, 1998). In many countries, 
however, tax reforms have removed many of these benefits (KKR, 1989; Newbould et al., 1992; 
Baker & Smith, 1998) in recent years.  
                                                           
11 The value creating impact of tax shields differs across countries and across time depending on tax regulations. 
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Other researchers argue that the cost of capital is more or less independent of leverage, 
since the tax advantage of a high level of debt is almost entirely offset by the higher cost of that 
debt (Long & Ravenscraft, 1993b; Opler & Titman, 1993; Samdani et al., 2001). Or as Rappaport 
(1990:102) puts it: "borrowing per se creates no value other than tax benefits. Value comes from 
the operational efficiencies debt inspires".12   
Financial engineering has direct impact on the bottom line of the portfolio company and 
thus represents a primary lever of value creation. To a large extent, it is extrinsic to the portfolio 
company, as expertise and reputation of the equity investors play a major role in the minimization 
of the cost of capital. The financial structure is largely determined during the acquisition phase, 
but financial engineering may continue to play a role during the holding period. 
 
While financial engineering was identified early on as a lever to create value in buyout 
transactions it took longer until buyout firms broadly acknowledged the need to focus on adding 
value by helping portfolio firms with their operations and strategy (Lerner et al., 1998). As the 
markets mature and become increasingly competitive buyout firms realize that they need to find 
ways to add value to their portfolio companies beyond financial engineering (Baker & Smith, 
1998).  
 
 Increasing  operational effectiveness 
While financial engineering focuses on capital structure and cost of capital, increasing 
operational effectiveness has an impact on the left side of the balance sheet, operating margins 
and cash flow. It is achieved through measures that enhance overall productivity and 
effectiveness of operations. While the strategic positioning of the company remains unchanged, 
                                                           
12 This effect will be discussed in more detail in the sections "Increasing opertional effectiveness" and "Reducing agency costs". 
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the configuration of a company's resources, i.e. how the different available resources are put to 
work, are being readjusted. In this process, the quantities of individual resources may be changed 
and single resources may be exchanged. A substantial amount of literature has developed that 
shows that buyout transactions have a positive effect on the operational performance of target 
companies13 (Baker & Wruck, 1989; Bull, 1989; Kaplan, 1989a; Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990; 
Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990; Singh, 1990; Smith, 1990a; Opler, 1992; Long & Ravenscraft, 
1993b; Ofek, 1994; Smart & Waldfogel, 1994; Phan & Hill, 1995; Holthausen & Larcker, 1996; 
Weir & Laing, 1998; Amess, 2002; Harris et al., 2002)14. We can distinguish between measures 
that increase operational effectiveness due to cost cutting and margin improvements, reduce 
capital requirements or the removal of managerial inefficiencies. 
 
Cost cutting and margin improvements 
Buyouts often substantially change the way the operations are organized and managed in the 
target company, with the goal to reduce cost and improve margins (Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 
1990) (Wright et al., 2001a).  After the acquisition the management immediately starts to tighten 
the control on corporate spending (Kaplan, 1989a; Magowan, 1989; Anders, 1992; Holthausen & 
Larcker, 1996) and initiates a series of cost reduction programs (Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990; 
Baker, 1992) . A variety of activities leads to a reduction in production cost and significantly 
increase plant productivity (Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990; Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990; Harris 
et al., 2002). In this context, the impact of buyouts on R&D expenses have received particular 
attention. Findings, however, tend to the contradictory, as a number of researchers e.g., (Hall, 
1990; Smith, 1990b; Long & Ravenscraft, 1993c, a; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994) report a reduction 
                                                           
13 The motivations of the managers to implement operational changes will be ignored for a moment (they will be discussed as 
part of the secondary levers) we will focus on the activities and measures that lead to the improvements in operational 
effectiveness. 
  20 
of R&D expenses after the buyout. Other studies (e.g.,  Bull, 1989; KKR, 1989; Lichtenberg & 
Siegel, 1990) failed to support the corresponding hypothesis (see Zahra & Fescina (1991) for an 
overview).  
Besides that, outsourcing of activities and the reduction of overheads (e.g., corporate 
center) plays a key role in achieving higher overall efficiency. Buyout companies typically 
develop a less bureaucratic structure with decreased corporate overhead cost (Easterwood et al., 
1989; Butler, 2001; Samdani et al., 2001). 
 
Reducing capital requirements 
In addition to taking out unnecessary costs it is quite common to increase capital 
productivity and/or reduce capital requirements of the business. One common way to achieve this 
is to make more efficient use of existing corporate assets (Lowenstein, 1985; Bull, 1989; Baker & 
Smith, 1998), i.e., to rationalize corporate operations, for example through an improved 
management of working capital (Baker & Wruck, 1989; Smith, 1990a; Kester & Luehrman, 
1995; Samdani et al., 2001).  Inventory control and accounts receivable management are 
tightened and professionalized (Magowan, 1989; Singh, 1990; Long & Ravenscraft, 1993a). This 
leads to sharply reduced levels of inventory and receivables compared to pre-buyout levels 
(Easterwood et al., 1989). Holthausen et al. (1996) found that post-buyout firms have, on 
average,  significantly smaller amounts of working capital than their industry counterparts. 
At the same time, the company adopts stricter regimes regarding capital expenditure that 
cut unsound investment programns and lead to the divestment of unnecessary or underutilized 
assets (Magowan, 1989; Phan & Hill, 1995). This leads to a consolidation and reorganization of 
production facilities and an increase in operational performance and total factor productivity on 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
14 See (Palepu, 1990)for an overview on the early literature until 1990. 
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the one hand and additional cash flow to pay down debt on the other hand (KKR, 1989; Seth & 
Easterwood, 1993).  
  It is important to keep in mind, however, that all these organizational changes need to be 
such that they do not negatively affect the company's ability to compete in the market place 
(Easterwood et al., 1989). It should also be mentioned that the generally increased efficiency and 
tighter cost control, which has developed in many corporations over the last decade, might mean 
that the scope for obtaining significant short-term benefits from restructuring is more limited 
(Wright & Robbie, 1996). 
 
Removing managerial inefficiencies 
Buyouts also often lead to improvements in operational effectiveness through the replacement of 
inefficient management teams (Anders, 1992). Following the logic of the market for corporate 
control (Manne, 1965), poor performance may be the result of inefficient management teams. 
Buyouts have been proposed as a vehicle to takeover companies with inefficient management 
teams for a valuation based on their poor performance and change the management team and thus 
remove the cause for this type of underperformance (Jensen & Ruback, 1983)15. Buyout 
investors can then benefit from the appreciation in company value due to the performance 
increase. 
  Increased operational effectiveness has a direct impact on both profitability and cash flow 
of the portfolio company. It is typically the result of a combination of intrinsic and extrinsic 
factors. While some of the decisions to enhance operational effectiveness may have already been 
                                                           
15 The case where buyout investors partner with an outside management team to gain control over a company and then replace 
the previous management team, have been termed "Management Buy-In (MBI)“. 
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embedded in the business plan that was developed during the acquisition base, most of these 
measures will only take effect during the holding period. 
 
 Increasing  strategic  distinctiveness 
  Buyouts can create value and improve performance beyond the increase of operational 
efficiency. Often, they lead to a redefinition of key strategic variables such as which markets to 
be in and with which products to compete and they conduct changes in pricing, product quality, 
customer service and customer mix as well as on the reorganization of distribution channels. This 
often goes along with a substantial change in the resource base of the company.  
Often buyouts lead to a corporate refocusing (Seth & Easterwood, 1993), along with an  overall 
reduction of complexity (Phan & Hill, 1995).  Through a reduction of the number and degree of 
diversity of different activities and the removal of inefficient cross-subsidies between different 
product lines (Liebeskind et al., 1992; Wiersema & Liebeskind, 1995), the portfolio company 
refocuses on its core business. Activities which are peripheral (from a strategic point of view) or 
not a competitive advantage for the company are often sold to another party that can make better 
use of it (Hoskisson & Turk, 1990; Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990; Singh, 1990; Anders, 1992; 
Baker, 1992; Seth & Easterwood, 1993; Singh, 1993; Baker & Smith, 1998)16. In general, 
resource allocation prioritizes projects, which are essential to maintaining or enhancing 
competitive advantage (Easterwood et al., 1989).  
It has been argued, however that the times when buyouts could be viewed as solely 
emphasizing downside efficiencies are over (Wright et al., 2001a). A successful exit of a buyout 
                                                           
16 We need to distinguish between "asset stripping" strategies, which have been treated as a case of financial arbitrage through an 
optimization of corporate scope, and the reduction of scope of activities to increase strategic distinctiveness. Asset stripping 
occurs on the corporate level and concerns the sale of entire business units, whereas the reduction of scope of activities 
happens on the business level when, for example, the reduction of a certain component gets outsourced and the corresponding 
facility shut down or divested. 
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via trade sale or initial public offering often requires a history of strong growth (Butler, 2001). 
This pushes companies to either pursue internal growth strategies and to actively strive for 
promising innovations (Markides, 1997, 1998; Wright et al., 2001a), or to seek external growth 
through acquisitions of new lines of business for an expansion of business scope in areas where 
distinctive competencies and resources are significant compared to the competition (Easterwood 
et al., 1989; Liebeskind et al., 1992; Seth & Easterwood, 1993; Wiersema & Liebeskind, 1995). 
 
Improved strategic distinctiveness also ensures a clear impact on the financial performance of the 
portfolio company and qualifies therefore as value creation. It is often achieved through an 
interaction between buyout investors and portfolio company and is thus partly intrinsic and partly 
extrinsic. While the overall strategic plan may be set during the acquisition phase already, its 
implementation happens during the holding period. 
 
  The previous passage has made it clear, that buyouts create value through a variety of 
different levers. The important question remains, however, why are companies able to pull these 
value creation levers in a buyout context and have not been able to do so before the buyout. The 
following description of secondary levers of buyouts value creation addresses this point and 
highlights a number of reasons why in many cases the buyout eventuates itself or the active 
equity investors facilitate or enhance the application of our primary value creation levers. 
 
Levers of Value Creation: Secondary Levers  
We have to remember that secondary levers of value creation do not have a direct impact on 
financial performance, but influence value creation through primary levers. We can distinguish 
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the secondary levers into one category related to the reduction of agency costs and a second 
category that is linked to mentoring. 
 
 
 Reducing  agency  costs 
The most prominent and exhaustively described value creation lever in buyouts is the reduction 
of agency costs (Wright et al., 2001a). It should be kept in mind that a reduction of agency cost, 
as a secondary lever of value creation, has no direct effect to the bottom line, as even the mere 
absence of agency costs does not guarantee business success (Bull, 1989). But the mechanisms 
leading to reduction of the agency conflict can support the three previously described primary 
levers. 
 
The magnitude of the agency problem in an organization depends on the degree of 
discretion in managerial decisions, the degree of misalignment in incentives between managers 
and owners and the degree to which a deviation from shareholder-wealth-maximizing decisions 
can be observed and sanctioned (Manne, 1962, 1966; Ross, 1973; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Fama, 1980; Berle & Means, 1982 (1933); Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1989b, a). Research 
has shown that agency conflicts are highly relevant in the buyout context (Opler & Titman, 
1993). The changes in organizational structure and ownership that become possible in a buyout 
transaction allow one to take advantage of agency cost reduction mechanisms and subsequently 
lead to an improved firm's operating performance (Kaplan, 1989a; Lehn & Poulsen, 1989; Smith, 
1990a; Thompson & Wright, 1991). Buyouts potentially influence all three factors and can thus 
reduce the agency problem significantly. 
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Reducing agency costs of free cash flow 
First of all, the increased level of debt we find in many buyouts (so-called "leveraged buyouts") 
plays a crucial role in the limitation of managerial discretion in buyouts. Jensen (1986; 1989b; 
1989a) emphasized that debt used to finance the buyout helps to limit the waste of free cash flow 
by compelling managers to service debt payments rather than spend it inefficiently within the 
firm. It reduces managers' discretion over corporate expenditures17 (Grossman & Hart, 1986; 
Smith, 1990a; Stulz, 1990) and limits possible non-value maximizing behaviour (Newbould et 
al., 1992). The debt burden forces managers to efficiently run the company to avoid default 
(Lowenstein, 1985; Jensen, 1986; Allen, 1999; Cotter & Peck, 2001).  
Bankruptcy is costly for managers, as they lose the benefits of control and reputation 
(Grossman & Hart, 1986). Consequently, high leverage and increased default risk can create an 
incentive for managers to work harder, consume fewer perquisites and make better investment 
decisions, as such behaviour reduces the probability of bankruptcy. 
Another positive effect of debt is the additional outsourced governance. Financial lenders 
have strong incentives to monitor the managements' actions and to make sure that the company is 
able to fulfil its duties.18 The debt covenants and repayment requirements serve as a sort of 
operating budget for the buyout company (Baker & Montgomery, 1994) and provide clear 
constraints for the management (Baker & Wruck, 1989; Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990). 
But it should be mentioned that high leverage in finance can have downsides for a 
company as well. Unforeseen shocks (e.g., increase in interest rates, shortfall in demand) can 
result in a dramatic corporate failure (Rappaport, 1990; Singh, 1990, 1993). Therefore the ability 
                                                           
17 A number of empirical studies have shown that expenditures decline following a leveraged buyout (Bull, 1989; Kaplan, 1989a; 
Kitching, 1989; Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990; Smith, 1990a) 
18 Thomspon et al. (1992) argued that institutions supplying debt and loan finance have a comparative advantage in monitoring a 
company because of their long experience in that matter. 
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of the buyout investors to quickly intervene and provide support in such situations can be of 
superior importance.19 Furthermore, the increased financial leverage can make a firm short-term 
oriented because of its vulnerability to financial distress, leading to a decline in competitiveness 
(Palepu, 1990; Gifford Jr., 2001). Rappaport (1990:97) argued that modern competition "requires 
the financial flexibility of a public company not burdened with extraordinary debt". In addition, 
leverage could affect project selection by managers due to managerial risk aversion: High 
leverage could cause risk-averse managers to alter their investment decisions in such way as to 
decrease the risk of the assets of the firm in order to reduce the likelihood of default (Holthausen 
& Larcker, 1996).20
 
Improving incentive alignment 
Buyouts also increase the incentive alignment between shareholders and managers through a 
combination of a "carrot" and a "stick" mechanism (Jensen, 1986, 1989b; Cotter & Peck, 2001). 
Buyout firms provide incentives (the "carrot") in order to align the interests of all parties involved 
and to reduce the agency conflict after the buyout (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1987; Bull, 1989; 
Jensen, 1989b; Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990; Frankfurter & Gunay, 1992). Managers are 
encouraged (if not forced) to increase their share in equity ownership in the company to a 
significant level (Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990; Baker & Montgomery, 1994).21 It is expected 
that this increase in the equity stake of the management directly increases the personal costs of 
                                                           
19 This support is a secondary lever of value creation that will be discussed in a following section. 
20 It has been argued that an emphasis on financial controls induces managerial risk aversion as well (see Lei & Hitt, 1995 for an 
overview). 
21 Managers get usually offered a substantial stake in the equity of the company to favourable conditions ("sweet equity"). But 
due to the high amount of the total investment compared to their personal net worth, managers usually have to take big 
financial risks to participate in the buyout ("pain equity") (Kitching, 1989; Thompson et al., 1992; Baker & Smith, 1998; 
Beaver, 2001; Samdani et al., 2001).    
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inefficiency (Smith, 1990b) and reduces their incentive to shirk (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
DeAngelo et al., 1984; Hite & Vetsuypens, 1989; Smith, 1990a; Weir & Laing, 1998).    
Furthermore, the change in status, from manager to co-owner could increase financial 
performance because it gives managers a positive incentive to look for efficiency gains and smart 
strategic moves (Phan & Hill, 1995; Weir & Laing, 1998). Their equity participation gives them a 
greater stake in any value-increasing actions that are taken (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and 
leads therefore to better operating and investment decisions (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1987; 
Easterwood et al., 1989; Palepu, 1990).22 Another motivational side effect of the construct is that 
management finds themselves with a substantial undiversifiable equity investment and their 
specific human capital locked into the company. This double lock-in (“the stick”) should give 
them a strong motivation to safeguard their position (Thompson et al., 1992). In addition to these 
extrinsic forms of motivation, buyout managers can also be expected to more closely identify 
themselves with their company, which contributes to a greater level of interest alignment between 
them and the equity investors based on intrinsic motivation (Gottschalg & Zollo, 2004). 
On the other hand increased managerial ownership in equity can result in a decrease in 
financial performance due to managerial risk aversion and the potential under-diversification of 
the managers' wealth (Demsetz, 1983; Fama & Jensen, 1985; Morck et al., 1988; Holthausen & 
Larcker, 1996) and (Fama & Jensen, 1983) argue that if managerial equity ownership is 
concentrated, the manager may have effective control over the organization and disciplining 
mechanisms such as the market for corporate control and managerial labour markets may be 
                                                           
22 The equity owned by management in the LBO companies is generally illiquid. However, because of the requirement that the 
LBO firm liquidate the limited partnership within a fairly short time period (10 years or less) there is a guarantee that the 
company will be valued, in a third-party transaction, at some point in the relatively near future. This guarantee of future 
liquidity, and of an object and unbiased valuation event, is crucial to the incentives provided by management equity 
ownership (Baker & Montgomery, 1994).  
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rendered ineffective, that could result in a decline in performance as well (Holthausen & Larcker, 
1996). 
In addition to an increased equity ownership of the top management, buyout firms 
increase the sensitivity of pay-to-performance for a large number of employees in the company 
(Jensen, 1989b, a; Anders, 1992; Fox & Marcus, 1992). Motivational systems get installed and 
employee contracts get changed in a way that motivates to achieve key tasks and include changes 
in the way employees get evaluated and compensated (Baker & Wruck, 1989; Easterwood et al., 
1989; Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990). These additional incentives are not necessarily restricted 
to those at the peak tier of authority. Buyouts may introduce employee share ownership plans or 
other shareholdings schemes and sometimes involve participation programmes (Thompson et al., 
1992). 
 Support for the view that incentives help to reduce managerial opportunism comes from 
(Wright et al., 1994b) who empirically showed that incentives were negatively related to MBO 
failure.   
 
Improving monitoring and controlling  
Finally, buyouts change the governance structure in a way that increases the possibilities to 
reduce the agency conflict through monitoring and controlling of the company management (Hite 
& Vetsuypens, 1989; Singh, 1990). The greater concentration of equity in the hands of active 
investors encourages closer monitoring and leads to a more active representation in the board of 
directors (DeAngelo et al., 1984; Jensen, 1989b, a; Smith, 1990a). The involvement in the 
monitoring of management as members of the board offers the chance to get direct access to 
confidential company information. This eases the oversight over ongoing operations as well as 
the evaluation of longer-term strategies. Portfolio companies' management gets continuously 
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evaluated through an ongoing process of control (Palepu, 1990; Anders, 1992; Cotter & Peck, 
2001).   
Buyout specialists are professional active investors that are likely to have a comparative 
advantage over third party equity investors in monitoring managers of post-buyout organization 
(DeAngelo et al., 1984; Jensen, 1989a; KKR, 1989; Frankfurter & Gunay, 1992; Cotter & Peck, 
2001). Their involvement in a large number of buyout investments improves their skills in 
monitoring. 
 
The reduction of the agency conflict through these mechanisms is a critical determinant of 
several of the factors previously discussed as primary levers value creation. Agency problems 
create inefficiencies, especially regarding improved operational effectiveness and strategic 
distinctiveness. The improved agency relationship after the buyout removes these inefficiencies 
and motivates management to pull the necessary levers value creation to maximize the value of 
the company. This includes taking even unpopular and difficult decisions like cutting jobs and 
disposing businesses as well (Butler, 2001). The different factors that contribute to a reduction of 
agency costs are all secondary levers of value generation. They are largely predetermined during 
the acquisition phase, even though the actual value creation effect only happens during the 
holding period. While the effect of increased leverage is independent of specific characteristics of 
the equity investors and thus intrinsic to the portfolio company, monitoring and controlling as 
well as the interest alignment depend on specific capabilities of the equity investors. 
 
 Mentoring 
 The last lever we describe is mentoring, or also calles the parenting advantage. Similar to the 
effect of being part of a certain corporation for a specific business unit that has been identified in 
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research on conglomerates (Goold et al., 1994), buyout firms can have an important impact on 
the value creation in the various buyout businesses of their "family". Even though buyout firms 
differ in the degree to which they are involved in the management of the portfolio company, they 
support the value creation in their portfolio companies in various ways. 
 
Restoring entrepreneurial spirit 
In many cases, companies that are acquired in buyouts suffer from a lack of entrepreneurial spirit. 
The reasons for this are manifold and include cases where non-core units of large corporations do 
not receive the necessary attention or resources from corporate headquarters to pursue innovative 
strategies or where risk-aversion led to an unfavourable climate for entrepreneurial activities. 
Buyout firms can use the buyout as a  vehicle of renewal leading to growth, corporate 
revitalization and strategic innovation (Wright et al., 2000; Wright et al., 2001a; Wright et al., 
2001b). The can actively contribute to the restoration of an entrepreneurial climate, by giving the 
management of portfolio companies' sufficient freedom to develop and realize innovative ideas.  
The new institutional structure and changed governance and interaction modes make managers of 
post-buyout companies feel released from corporate bureaucracy and of central importance
23  
(Lowenstein, 1985; Jensen, 1989a; Hoskisson & Turk, 1990; Butler, 2001; Wright et al., 2001a), 
as many buyout firms reduce their interference with day-to-day operational issues to a minimum, 
as long as financial targets are met.  Portfolio company managers feel and act as entrepreneurs in 
their organizations, freed from the constraints of a corporate centre and encouraged to make 
independent decisions (Bull, 1989; Jensen, 1989a; Houlden, 1990; Singh, 1990; Kester & 
Luehrman, 1995; Weir, 1996; Bruining & Wright, 2002). Researchers describe this effect as 
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"LBO fever" or "adrenalin": energized and highly motivated management teams are willing to 




Advising and enabling 
Another positive effect of belonging to a particular buyout firm as the "parent company" can 
come from the constructive interaction between portfolio company managers and their 
counterparts in the buyout firms, which is often facilitated through direct and unbureaucratic 
communication channels (Kester & Luehrman, 1995). While the investment managers in the 
buyout firms typically stay free of the day-to-day operations, they are still much closer to 
operations and management than conglomerate headquarters or the board of directors in 
traditional organizations (Bull, 1989; Hite & Vetsuypens, 1989; Anders, 1992).  
 At the same time, buyout firms are known for their ability to produce "stretch budgets" 
(Anders, 1992; Baker & Montgomery, 1994; Butler, 2001) and to, in general, raise the standards 
for management performance. By increasing the minimum level of acceptable performance 
managers are forced to work harder after the buyout or they risk losing their jobs (Baker & 
Wruck, 1989; Magowan, 1989).  They also spend a serious amount of time on selecting the top 
management team after the buyout25 and they usually do not hesitate to replace it if corporate 
performance should falter (Anders, 1992). Overall, target setting is much more aspirational in 
buyouts. It is not surprising that they expect, for example, the business to double EBITDA in five 
years time (Butler, 2001).  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
23 Wright et al. (2001a) highlighted that managers of pre-buyout organizations are discouraged if their divisions provided 
profitable and innovative investment opportunities but were limited in their discretion because of the fact that the division was 
not regarded central to the parent organization (see also Weir, 1996; Beaver, 2001) 
24 The motivational effect of incentive systems that has been discussed in the section on agency cost certainly also contributes to 
this phenomenon. 
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Furthermore, buyout sponsors understand their role vis-à-vis the portfolio company 
management as active advisors and enablers. Usually, the lead representative of the buyout firm 
serves as the top management's sounding board on both day-to-day operations and long-term 
decisions and provides additional perspectives on, and knowledge of, strategy, markets and 
external conditions (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1987; Baker & Wruck, 1989; Sapienza & Timmons, 
1989; Houlden, 1990; Kester & Luehrman, 1995; Bruining & Wright, 2002). The buyout 
specialists bring to the new unit additional management expertise and industry experience 
acquired in previous transactions in which they participated, which constitutes a case of 
knowledge transfer from the new owners to the target company (Baker & Smith, 1998). This 
"cross-utilization" of managerial talent can represent a valuable and not otherwise readily 
available resource to the buyout company (Hite & Vetsuypens, 1989).  Another source of value 
added through the buyout firm comes from their network of contacts in various industries and 
especially in the financial and consulting markets that can be exploited to the benefit of the 
buyout transaction (Kaufman & Englander, 1993; Baker & Smith, 1998; Bruining & Wright, 
2002). Be it to find a business partner, to search for and to recruit a new manager for the portfolio 
company (headhunting services) or to identify potential targets for the buy-and-build strategy, 
contacts of the buyout firm may be an important success factor for the portfolio company. 
  Mentoring represents a secondary lever of value creation. Advising and enabling are 
inherently linked to characteristics of the equity investors and thus extrinsic in nature. To some 
extent, an entrepreneurial orientation may exist in the portfolio company per se, that just has to 
be “freed” by the equity investors, so that this lever can be partially intrinsic and partially 
extrinsic. Mentoring can be active throughout all three phases of the buyout. 
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25 This team can be composed of previous managers of the buyout company or of outside managers.  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study provides a detailed and comprehensive synopsis of the literature on buyout value 
generation of the last twenty years, pulling together arguments from a variety of different 
academic areas.  The application of our new conceptual framework makes it possible to classify 
various levers of buyout value generation according to three dimensions. We identify seventeen 
distinctly different levers of value generation, discuss the way they influence returns to the 
buyout investors and outline key arguments of the academic discourse of these levers whenever 
beneficial for our understanding.  For the sake of completeness, new or less prominent levers of 
value generation have been added and put into context (see Table 1). 
 




  Our three-dimensional framework offers a structure to the disperse field and views the 
topic from various different angles. This framework helps us to structure the complexity of the 
buyout value generation process and increases our understanding of the interconnectedness of the 
different levers, their importance during the different phases of the buyout and the degree to 
which they are inherently linked to the specific characteristics of the sponsoring buyout investor.   
This structured view of the buyout value generation process illustrates that all three phases of the 
buyout contribute significantly to value generation and shows that buyouts value generation is 
not entirely "front loaded", as suggested by Baker & Montgomery (1994). At the same time, the 
importance of specific characteristics of the equity investors for buyout value generation is 
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striking. The large number of value generation levers that qualify as (at least partially) extrinsic 
in that they depend on characteristics of the equity investors, suggests that it really makes a 
difference who undertakes the buyout. For investment managers in buyout firms, who compete 
with increasing intensity for suitable buyout targets, this has important implications. Buyout 
firms need to carefully analyse through which levers they can add value in the process, and 
specifically through which levers they may have an edge over competing bidders for a given 
company. This suggests that a strategic positioning of buyout firms, through which they 
consciously explore and exploit their competitive advantage in buyout value generation is 
becoming increasingly relevant. 
The appendix provides a comprehensive overview of the studies on levers of buyout value 
generation in the previous literature and specifies in which area the different studies contribute to 
the theoretical discussion, provide anecdotal evidence and conduct empirical tests of the different 
phenomena. 
Our review of the literature on buyout value generation reveals that much research has 
been conducted in the late 80s and the early 90s.  If we consider the fact that this period was 
characterized by highly leveraged going-private transactions (mainly in the US), it is not 
surprising that most of the empirical testing is based on this type of case. While these studies 
have been helpful to understand the basic logic of buyout transactions, it is important to 
recognize that the development in recent years and the international spread of buyout activity has 
led to a great variety of different facets of buyouts. These may differ substantially from early 
transactions in their strategic logic and value generation mechanisms, so that earlier studies may 
be less suitable to explain them. 
Furthermore the synopsis (see Appendix) shows that some topics have received more attention 
while others have been somewhat neglected.  On the one hand this may lie in the difficulties to 
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operationalize and manage some of the "softer" levers of value generation, such as the parenting 
effect. On the other hand it shows that the research on buyouts and buyout value generation has 
dominated for a long time from the agency theory perspective. This has changed only recently 
and research has broadened. The latest findings categorizing buyouts as vehicles for 
entrepreneurship document that trend.   
  Overall, a lack of empirical evidence for the different value generation levers becomes 
obvious from our overview. Much of the existing empirical evidence is rather anecdotal in nature 
and cannot be taken as conclusive support for the actual relevance of these levers.  In addition, 
many levers are still entirely statistically untested and much of the quantitative empirical work 
we have seen is limited in its power by small sample sizes and an operationalisation of key 
constructs that has been subject to criticism (Fox & Marcus, 1992). In the light of the complex 
process through which various levers interact to generate value in buyouts, the importance to 
expand the scope of empirical studies to models that consider multiple levers simultaneously in a 
multivariate analysis becomes obvious. Only through such work, will it be possible to draw any 
kind of inference regarding the significance and relative magnitude of the different levers.  
 
This lack of empirical work may be partially due to difficulties to get access to data in an 
industry that calls itself “private equity”. Nevertheless, we consider it highly worthwhile to take 
the long way and compose a data set of sufficient breadth and depth that makes it possible to tests 
more comprehensive models of buyout value generation. We are convinced that our synopsis and 
framework provide a good starting point and frame for this kind of work. Such work will not only 
increase our understanding of buyouts, as a phenomenon of great economic relevance.  Research 
on buyouts can also be used to focus on effects of great relevance in a broader strategic 
management context that can be observed in the buyout setting. Of particular interest in this 
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context may be further insights regarding the role of buyouts as vehicles to (re-)establish 
entrepreneurial notions in mature organizations. 
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* X= lever can be categorized accordingly; (X)= lever can be categorized only with limitations 
TABLE X: BUYOUT VOLOUME (EQUITY PORTION ONLY) 
 
Years 
Equity Invested by Buyout Funds (USD 
Mio)  
1992                                            7.114.253  
1993                                            7.213.082  
1994                                            9.426.275  
1995                                            8.930.044  
1996                                          17.038.875  
1997                                          19.864.298  
1998                                          34.012.983  
1999                                          49.738.511  
2000                                          61.327.554  
2001                                          35.792.217  
2002                                          33.562.632  
 
SOURCE: INSEAD ANALYSIS
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APPENDIX: Studies on value generation* in buyouts along levers and type of contribution 
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Palepu, 1990: 248; Rappaport, 1990: 97; 
Singh, 1990: 126; Smith, 1990a: 144; 
Stulz, 1990: 4; Fox & Marcus, 1992: 66; 
Newbould et al., 1992: 50; Singh, 1993: 
157; Baker & Montgomery, 1994: 20; Lei 
& Hitt, 1995: 847; Holthausen & Larcker, 
1996: 295; Allen, 1999: 710; Cotter & 
Peck, 2001: 102; Gifford Jr., 2001: 18) 
 
E-2.    Improving  incentive
alignment 
(DeAngelo et al., 1984: 372; Jensen, 
1986: 326; DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1987: 
41; Baker & Wruck, 1989: 176; Bull, 
1989: 264; Easterwood et al., 1989: 40; 
Hite & Vetsuypens, 1989: 955; Jensen, 
1989b: 64+68; 1989a: 39; Kitching, 1989: 
75; Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990: 166; 
Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990: 
1393+1396; Palepu, 1990: 248; Singh, 
1990: 126; Smith, 1990b: 21; 1990a: 144; 
Stulz, 1990: 4; Anders, 1992: 80; Fox & 
Marcus, 1992: 76; Frankfurter & Gunay, 
1992: 84; Thompson et al., 1992: 63; 
Baker & Montgomery, 1994: 16; Wright 
et al., 1994b: 38; Phan & Hill, 1995: 706; 
Holthausen & Larcker, 1996: 295; Baker 
& Smith, 1998: 57+96; Weir & Laing, 
1998: 262; Beaver, 2001: 308; Cotter & 
Peck, 2001: 102; Samdani et al., 2001: 
100) 
  
(Baker & Wruck, 1989 (s); Anders, 
1992 (s)) 
(Kitching, 1989 (s); Frankfurter & 
Gunay, 1992 (s); Wright et al., 1994b 
(s); Phan & Hill, 1995 (s)) 
E-3.  Improving monitoring and 
controlling 
(DeAngelo et al., 1984: 373; Hite & 
Vetsuypens, 1989: 956; Jensen, 1989b: 
64; 1989a: 36; Kitching, 1989: 75; KKR, 
1989: 68; Palepu, 1990: 247; Singh, 1990: 
112; Smith, 1990a: 144; Anders, 1992: 
84; Frankfurter & Gunay, 1992: 84; 
Cotter & Peck, 2001: 101+135) 
  (Cotter & Peck, 2001 (s)) 








    
F-1.    Restoring  entrepreneurial
spirit 
(Lowenstein, 1985: 756; Bull, 1989: 277; 
Hite & Vetsuypens, 1989: 955; Jensen, 
1989a: 36; Hoskisson & Turk, 1990: 472; 
Houlden, 1990: 74; Singh, 1990: 112; 
Kester & Luehrman, 1995: 120+123; 
Weir, 1996: 25; Baker & Smith, 1998: 56; 
Beaver, 2001: 308; Butler, 2001: 144; 
Gifford Jr., 2001; Samdani et al., 2001: 
101; Wright et al., 2001a: 118; Bruining 
& Wright, 2002: 165) 
 
(Baker & Smith, 1998 (s))   
F-2.  Advising and enabling  (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1987: 43; Baker 
& Wruck, 1989: 176+183; Hite & 
Vetsuypens, 1989: 956; Magowan, 1989: 
14; Sapienza & Timmons, 1989: 77; 
Houlden, 1990: 74; Singh, 1990: 112; 
Anders, 1992: 84; Kaufman & Englander, 
1993: 75; Baker & Montgomery, 1994: 
22; Kester & Luehrman, 1995: 123; Baker 
& Smith, 1998: 100+171+174; Butler, 
2001: 146; Bruining & Wright, 2002: 
165) 
 




*  This Appendix lists only publications with a clear buyout focus. 
**  Studies in order of publication date and in alphabetical order within a year. Page follow year of publication. 
***  s = supported; n = not supported  
  (This reflects only the outcome of the empirical testing of the studiesa nd  has not been reviewed qualitatively by the authors.) 
****  Studies that focus explicitly on the development of R&D expenses after a buyout. 
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